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Abstract 
The stimulus-preceding negativity (SPN) component reflects the anticipatory phase of reward processing. 
Its amplitude is usually larger for informative compared to uninformative upcoming stimuli, as well as for 
uncertain relative to predictable ones. In this study, we sought to assess whether these two effects, when 
combined together, produced a synergistic effect or rather independent ones on the SPN during 
performance monitoring. Participants performed a speeded Go/NoGo task while 64-channel EEG was 
recorded concurrently. We focused on the SPN activity generated in anticipation of feedback, which was 
either positive (for correct and fast reactions) or negative (for correct but slow responses). Further, the 
feedback’s informativeness about the satisfaction status of goals was alternated across blocks. When 
uncertainty about the action outcome was low (in conditions where positive feedback was either less or 
more frequent than negative feedback), the SPN amplitude (measured at fronto-central electrodes) did not 
vary as a function of feedback’s relevance or valence. By comparison, when positive and negative 
feedback were equiprobable (uncertainty was high), the SPN was more pronounced for relevant compared 
to irrelevant feedback. Interestingly, in this condition, it was also larger at right fronto-central sites for 
positive than negative feedback. These ERP results suggest that both factors–relevance and uncertainty– 
combine and influence reward anticipation at the SPN level.  
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1. Introduction 
During performance monitoring, both internal (motor) and external (feedback) cues are usually processed 
and used to adjust behavior when mismatches between goals and actions are detected. Several studies 
using the event-related potentials (ERP) technique have previously shown that the feedback-related 
negativity (FRN) component reflects external feedback information processing during performance 
monitoring. According to the dominant account, the FRN reflects a phasic reward prediction error signal 
generated by specific fronto-striatal loops (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Holroyd et al., 2008; Sambrook and 
Goslin, 2015; Walsh and Anderson, 2012). When the performance or evaluative feedback conveys 
information about an unexpected mismatch between the hoped-for and the actual outcome, a negative-
going wave is elicited over fronto-central locations, peaking at around 250 ms post-feedback onset at Fz or 
FCz sensors. In line with the reward prediction error account, FRN amplitude is larger for unexpected 
relative to expected events (Hajcak et al., 2007; Pfabigan et al., 2011; von Borries et al., 2013), and for 
worse-than-expected events, that is, for negative compared to positive performance feedback (Miltner et 
al., 1997; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004).  
Performance monitoring is a process which is highly dynamic and flexible, seeking to exploit the 
most informative cue available at a given time and avoiding redundancy (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; 
Ullsperger et al., 2014). In a situation where the processing of external feedback information is impossible 
(i.e., feedback information is not available or is perceived as unreliable), the processing of internal (i.e., 
motor response-based) events prevails and is used to guide the course of performance monitoring. In this 
situation, the error-related negativity (ERN) component indexing the early, perhaps automatic, detection 
of response errors based on a swift comparison between the intended and actual motor response is usually 
elicited at the same fronto-central electrode positions (Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 1993; 
Ullsperger et al., 2014). 
Performance monitoring is not only based on phasic (and reactive) reward prediction error effects 
upon response execution (ERN) or feedback processing (FRN), but it also usually operates based on 
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additional cues that occur after the response but before the outcome, and that are mostly proactive and 
anticipatory in nature (hence are less phasic and more sustained than the ERN or FRN). Indeed, several 
earlier ERP studies have identified an ERP component occurring after response execution and during 
feedback anticipation
1
, called the stimulus-preceding negativity (SPN; Brunia, 1988; Brunia and van 
Boxtel, 2001; Brunia et al., 2011; Chwilla and Brunia, 1991). The SPN amplitude typically increases from 
parietal or central to frontal locations, with a right hemispheric dominance usually observed over 
(pre)frontal areas (F4 vs. F3), consistent with a putative main intracranial generator in the right anterior 
insular cortex (Brunia, 1988; Brunia et al., 2000, 2011). Even though the SPN has been much less 
explored in the existing literature than the ERN or FRN components (especially in relation to performance 
monitoring processes), some studies have already shed light on its putative function. According to the 
most dominant (motivation-based) model, the SPN is a neurophysiological marker of the anticipation of 
meaningful information (Brunia and van Boxtel, 2001; Brunia et al., 2011; Kotani et al, 2001, 2003; 
Masaki et al., 2006, 2010; Ohgami et al., 2004, 2006; van Boxtel and Böcker, 2004). This model predicts 
a larger and more negative SPN for the anticipation of stimuli that are deemed highly informative 
compared to ones that carry less information. In line with this, several ERP studies confirmed that the 
anticipation of stimuli that are informative about rewards and punishments (including monetary gain, 
evocative photos, or electric shocks) led to a more pronounced SPN component, compared to the 
anticipation of stimuli considered uninformative or less informative (Kotani et al., 2009; Masaki et al., 
2006; van Boxtel and Bӧcker, 2004).  
In performance monitoring research, performance feedback is a good example of a highly 
informative stimulus. In accordance with this notion, Masaki and colleagues (2010) reported a larger SPN 
in response to the anticipation of an action-contingent positive feedback (i.e., monetary gain) compared 
with a reward feedback that was non-contingent on the preceding action. This and other findings have led 
to the consensus in the psychophysiology literature that the SPN component reflects the anticipation of 
informative events (Brunia, 1988; Chwilla and Brunia, 1991). It remains currently unclear, however, what 
                                                          
1
 This is especially true when the feedback is contingent on behavioral performance and/or motor responses. 
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“informative” means in this specific framework, especially when it comes to dissecting possible 
performance monitoring processes at stake during feedback/outcome anticipation. 
In previous work (Walentowska et al., 2016), we conceptualized informativeness within the 
notion of goal relevance (see also Moors, 2007). We distinguished between three separate, but related, 
meanings of goal relevance: (i) task relevance, which means that a stimulus signals an opportunity to 
implement goal-directed behavior, which may or may not lead to goal satisfaction; (ii) informativeness, or 
the degree to which a stimulus is informative about the satisfaction status of pursued goals; and (iii) the 
impact that a stimulus has on these pursued goals. Feedback stimuli are especially deemed goal relevant in 
the second and/or third sense. They usually come with a degree of informativeness or trustworthiness 
(Walentowska et al., 2016), and they can impact on goals to a variable extent (from little to a lot; see also 
Severo et al., 2017). Note that the type of informativeness at stake here is not simply of any type, but one 
that conveys information on the satisfaction status of goals. Taking a closer look at previous performance 
monitoring research studying the role of the SPN component, it seems that informativeness was used there 
in exactly this second sense. Indeed, in the study of Masaki et al. (2010), performance feedback either did 
or did not inform the actor about the degree to which his/her action corresponded to an intended action; 
hence this feedback varied with respect to whether it was informative about the satisfaction status of the 
goal to engage in the action. Moreover, if the intended action was at the service of higher-order goals, 
such as the goal to earn money or social status, the performance feedback not only informed the actor 
about the satisfaction status of the goal to perform well on a particular trial or the task as a whole, but also 
about the satisfaction status of these higher-order goals (Severo et al., 2017). In this paper, we focus on 
informativeness as it relates to goal relevance in the second sense. From now on, we refer to this type of 
informativeness as goal relevance or relevance. 
 Previous work (Walentowska et al., 2016) already showed that the FRN component 
(differentiating positive from negative feedback) was elicited when the performance feedback was 
perceived as goal relevant by the participants but not when it was perceived as irrelevant. Based on these 
findings, we formulated the prediction that goal-relevant feedback could also elicit a larger SPN 
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component than goal-irrelevant feedback. This was the first prediction that we aimed to test in the current 
study.  
Informativeness as it relates to goal relevance is not the only factor used by performance 
monitoring brain systems during feedback anticipation. Another factor that is very likely to influence this 
processing stage, but that is rather poorly explored in the existing ERP literature on performance 
monitoring, is the perceived probability and hence (un)certainty about the upcoming performance 
feedback. In classical information theory, the notion of uncertainty is linked to the notion of 
informativeness. As postulated by Shannon (1948), information can be thought of as the resolution of 
uncertainty. "Information" is a set of possible messages, which should be sent over a noisy channel, and 
reconstructed by the receiver with low probability of errors, despite the channel noise. The key measure in 
information theory is "entropy", which quantifies the amount of uncertainty or randomness before an 
outcome is revealed and hence the degree of information that is carried by the outcome once it is revealed. 
For example, the coin flip with two equally likely outcomes and hence less uncertainty leads to an 
outcome with less information (lower entropy) than the roll of a die with six equally likely outcomes and 
hence more uncertainty. Classical information theory thus entails that the higher the entropy is, the more 
uncertain the outcome is before it is revealed, and the more information the outcome therefore provides 
once it is revealed (see also Luce, 2003).  
The link between uncertainty and informativeness is also exemplified in animal and human brain 
studies, in which it has been demonstrated that uncertainty (e.g., the volatility of stimulus-outcome 
associations) and curiosity play a central role in estimating and learning actions (Bennett et al., 2016; Kid 
and Hayden, 2015), with a dominant role of the anterior cingulate cortex in decision making and reward 
processing (Behrens et al., 2007). Interestingly, Bach and Dolan (2012) identified the (anterior) insula as 
an important limbic structure within a distributed brain network directly involved in computing 
uncertainty. Given that the (right) anterior insular cortex is thought to be one of the main intracranial 
generators of the SPN component (Brunia, 1988; Brunia et al., 2011), it is conceivable that uncertainty 
processing influences the SPN during feedback anticipation.  
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Some recent ERP studies have already provided support for the notion that the amplitude of the 
SPN component is related to uncertainty or unpredictability. Their results showed that the amplitude of the 
SPN was systematically larger in situations where participants anticipated unpredictable (Catena et al., 
2012; Morís et al., 2013) or unexpected reward (Fuentemilla et al., 2013) compared to feedback that was 
highly predictable or expected. Accordingly, we can derive the prediction that uncertainty should augment 
the size of the SPN during feedback anticipation. This prediction constituted the second hypothesis tested 
in the present study.  
When positive and negative feedback following action execution are equiprobable, uncertainty 
about the action outcome is the highest. However, when uncertainty about the action outcome is reduced, 
the predicted increase in SPN may result not only from low uncertainty but also from changes in 
motivation in the low reward probability condition, in which negative feedback dominates over positive 
feedback. In this condition, not only the uncertainty is lower compared to the equiprobable condition, but 
defensive motivation is also likely to prevail. Because defensive motivation can influence performance 
monitoring (Koban and Pourtois, 2014), it is unclear in this condition whether (un)certainty or defensive 
motivation influences reward anticipation at the SPN level. In the high reward probability condition, on 
the other hand, in which positive feedback dominates over negative feedback, such a change in defensive 
motivation is unlikely to occur. Thus, to ascertain that uncertainty is one of the key components 
modulating reward anticipation at the SPN level instead of changes in motivation, it appears important to 
compare the uncertain condition to both the low and high reward probability conditions. These latter two 
conditions offer lower uncertainty, albeit in opposite directions (see Figure 1 B). In the current study, we 
directly addressed this issue and eventually included and compared three levels of reward probability in 
order to disentangle the uncertainty account from the motivation account at the SPN level. 
Previous research on the role of the SPN component has focused either on informativeness in the 
sense of goal relevance (e.g., Masaki et al., 2010) or on informativeness in the sense of uncertainty 
reduction (Morís et al., 2013). The main goal of our study was to investigate both information-related 
factors simultaneously, and to explore their specific contributions to reward anticipation during 
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performance monitoring, focusing therefore on the SPN component. To this aim, we devised a factorial 
design where we could thoroughly explore the interplay of relevance with uncertainty during reward 
anticipation at the SPN level, and we eventually assessed whether these two variables showed mainly 
independent effects, or rather a synergistic one during this process (see Figure 1 A). To achieve this, we 
extracted and analyzed the SPN component from an existing ERP study by Walentowska et al. (2016), in 
which a speeded Go/NoGo task was used (previously validated extensively across different ERP studies, 
Aarts and Pourtois, 2010, 2012; Godefroid et al., 2016; Koban et al., 2012; Paul et al., 2017; Pourtois, 
2011; Severo et al., 2017; Vocat et al., 2008). In this previous study, both the response-locked (CRN), and 
stimulus/feedback-locked (FRN and P3) components were carefully analyzed and reported, but not the 
SPN. Hence the current study reports new results for the SPN that were not part of this earlier publication. 
Moreover, in this previous report, only two levels of reward probability (i.e., low and intermediate) were 
considered. In the current study, we compared them to a third level (i.e., high reward probability), for 
which entirely new EEG data were collected and analyzed. 
The added value of using the speeded Go/NoGo task is that participants have to rely on and 
carefully monitor performance feedback to assess, on a trial-by-trial basis, whether their actions are goal 
conducive (i.e., correct and fast reactions) or not (i.e., response errors or correct but slow reactions). 
Moreover, two methodological features are worth mentioning. (i) Because performance is calibrated using 
an online and adaptive (trial-by-trial and subject-specific) algorithm (see Methods section for details), one 
can create with this paradigm a situation where feedback is uncertain (i.e., the participant cannot predict 
easily whether the feedback will be positive or negative before its onset) and two other ones where 
feedback certainty is substantially increased (i.e., reward probability is clearly low or high), thereby 
offering an experimental manipulation of (un)certainty across these three conditions. (ii) Orthogonally to 
this first manipulation, one can also, by means of instructions and a standard cueing technique, devise a 
situation where it is clear that the performance feedback provided reflects actual performance (i.e., goal-
relevant condition), or instead is decoupled from it (goal-irrelevant condition), providing thus a way to 
manipulate the perceived goal relevance across different blocks. For methodological reasons (see Methods 
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section and Walentowska et al., 2016), goal relevance was manipulated across successive blocks and 
treated as a within-subject variable, while uncertainty (manipulated via reward probability) was 
manipulated as a between-subjects factor. In light of the evidence reviewed above, we predicted that the 
amplitude of the SPN component would increase as a function of increased informativeness both in the 
sense of goal relevance and uncertainty reduction. More specifically, we reckoned that the anticipation of 
informative performance feedback (because of being relevant and/or uncertainty reducing) would be 
associated with a larger SPN component compared to uninformative feedback (see Figure 1 A). 
Importantly, if uncertainty was the main component accounting for amplitude changes at the SPN level (as 
opposed to motivation), then the low and high reward probability conditions should yield statistically 
similar effects (i.e., no clear SPN modulation in both cases), compared to the intermediate reward 
probability condition where the SPN should be the largest because uncertainty was the highest (see Figure 
1 B). 
 [insert Figure 1 about here] 
2. Methods 
2.1. Participants 
Ninety young healthy adults (university undergraduate students) participated in this study. Thirty (6 men; 
mean age: 21.9; SD = 2.7) were exposed to a version of the speeded Go/NoGo task where reward 
probability was low (and thus feedback’s uncertainty was low), 30 others (8 men; mean age: 22.1; SD = 
2.3) received a version where reward probability was intermediate (i.e., reward and punishment were 
equiprobable so that feedback’s uncertainty was substantially increased), and another sample of 30 (10 
men; mean age: 23.5; SD = 2.2) to a high reward probability condition (where feedback’s uncertainty was 
also low). All subjects were right handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They were free of 
neurological or psychiatric history and of any psychoactive treatment. Prior to the experiment they gave 
written informed consent. All subjects participated in the study in exchange of 30 Euro compensation (and 
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were not compensated for better performance). The SPN data for the low and intermediate reward 
probability conditions were extracted from a previously published dataset (with different ERPs in scope; 
Walentowska et al., 2016). For the high reward probability condition, new EEG data were recorded.  
2.2. Experimental task and design 
A modified version of a well-validated speeded Go/NoGo task (see Aarts and Pourtois, 2010, 2012; 
Godefroid et al., 2016; Koban et al., 2012; Paul et al., 2017; Pourtois, 2011; Severo et al., 2017; Vocat et 
al., 2008) was used in the current study (see Figure 1 A for trial structure). Each trial started with the 
presentation of a black fixation cross lasting for 1000 ms. Then, a black arrow (‘cue’), either oriented up 
or down, was presented. After a variable interval (1000-2000 ms), this black arrow became either green or 
turquoise, while its in-plane orientation could either remain the same or shift in the opposite orientation. 
When the black arrow turned green and the orientation remained unchanged (‘target’), participants were 
asked to press a predefined key on the response box as fast as possible with the index finger of their right 
hand (‘Go trials’). However, participants were asked to inhibit their responses when either the arrow 
became green but flipped orientation, or when the arrow became turquoise and kept its initial orientation 
(‘non-targets’ in ‘NoGo trials’). In the absence of motor responses, targets and non-targets remained on 
the screen for 1000 ms. Cues, targets, and non-targets consisted of an arrow, presented in the center of the 
screen on a white background. After motor responses (correct: ‘hits’; incorrect: ‘false alarms’), a colored 
frame was presented around the target (1000 ms). Next, a response-feedback interval was presented (1000 
ms), providing the main event of interest for the SPN data analysis (see Figure 1 A). This event consisted 
of the presentation of the colored frame only, and it served to signal to the participant whether the 
feedback provided was either relevant or irrelevant. The colored frame around the feedback remained on 
the screen for 1000 ms. 
Participants were given positive feedback when they responded both correctly and fast to Go trials 
(‘fast hit’), and when they correctly inhibited responding to NoGo trials (‘correct inhibition’). Conversely, 
they were given negative feedback when the response was correct but too slow (‘slow hit’), when they 
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responded to NoGo trials (‘false alarm’), or when there was no response to Go trials (‘omission’). 
Importantly, we used an online adaptive algorithm to set up a (subject and trial-specific) limit for correct 
and fast RTs (i.e., response deadline procedure) in Go trials. At the beginning of the experiment, the RT 
limit was set to 300 ms (based on previous pilot testing and Vocat et al., 2008). This limit was later 
adjusted online (i.e., after each trial) as a function of the preceding trial history (thus, as the mean of 
current and previous RTs). Responses slower than the limit were classified as slow hits, while those faster 
than the limit were classified as fast hits. The advantage of this algorithm is that uncertainty about current 
RTs is high throughout the task, which should strongly motivate participants to actively attend to the 
external feedback stimulus presented after each response to infer whether their actions (during Go trials) 
were timely (fast hits) or not (slow hits). The response deadline was also updated throughout the whole 
experimental session in order to avoid habituation or fatigue, and it was originally set up in such a way 
that correct and fast responding to Go trials was fairly difficult to achieve, reducing uncertainty (i.e., low 
reward probability – 33%; see Aarts and Pourtois, 2010; 2012; Dhar and Pourtois, 2011; Dhar et al., 2011; 
Koban et al., 2010, 2012; Vocat et al., 2008). One group of participants (n = 30) received this specific 
version of the task.  
Another group of participants (n = 30) received another version of the exact same speeded 
Go/NoGo task where the online response deadline to differentiate fast from slow hits was more liberal, 
increasing in turn reward probability (up to 50%; intermediate reward probability condition), thereby 
creating full uncertainty about the feedback. In this version of the task, the RT deadline was adjusted 
across blocks using specific (predefined) time limits. Specifically, it was set to 300 (in Blocks 1-2), 275 
(in Blocks 3-4), and 250 ms (in Blocks 5-6), yielding in most participants (as established based on 
extensive piloting, see Walentowska et al., 2016) a balanced number of fast hits and slow hits.  
A final group of participants (n = 30) was exposed to another version of this speeded Go/NoGo 
task. Specifically, to create a condition in which uncertainty about the feedback was low, but reward 
dominated (i.e., high reward probability), the RT deadline was adjusted across blocks using predefined 
time limits, with 310 (in Blocks 1-2), 300 (in Blocks 3-4), and 290 ms (in Blocks 5-6). These specific 
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values were estimated after extensive piloting. Using these settings, participants ended up on average 
having 66% of positive feedback (fast hits) and 33% of negative feedback (slow hits) throughout the 
experimental session (see Figure 2 A). Accordingly, uncertainty (about the feedback) was manipulated 
using a between-subjects variable in the current study, being high in the intermediate reward probability 
condition, and being equally low in both the low and high reward probability conditions.  
In this task, feedback following actions on NoGo trials (positive feedback following a correct 
inhibition or negative feedback following a false alarm) is not informative as participants can evaluate the 
accuracy of their actions on these trials using internal monitoring and thus motor cues (Koban et al., 
2012). Therefore, in this study, we focused primarily on Go trials that were followed either by positive or 
negative feedback for which conspicuous SPN components were elicited. 
Orthogonally to the manipulation of the feedback uncertainty, the goal relevance of the feedback 
(relevant vs. irrelevant) also varied in a binary way across successive blocks. Hence, goal relevance was 
manipulated within subjects in this study. Written instructions delivered before the start of each block, as 
well as a specific colored frame (either blue or magenta) appearing at the response onset (key press), were 
given to the participants to inform them about the relevance (relevant vs. irrelevant) of the feedback 
received during this specific block. When the feedback was relevant, it meant that it was genuinely related 
to the actual speed and the accuracy of the response (thus, participants always received positive feedback 
after fast hits or correct inhibitions, while they received negative feedback in case of slow hits, false 
alarms, or omissions). In comparison to that, when being irrelevant, the feedback provided after the 
response was never related to the actual performance, but randomly drawn from a pre-existing list 
irrespective of the accuracy and speed of the preceding action performed by the participants. In the low 
and intermediate reward probability conditions, positive and negative feedbacks were delivered to 
participants equally often, while in the high reward probability condition irrelevant feedback distribution 
was matched with relevant context (i.e., throughout the block, participants received 66% of positive 
feedbacks and 33% of negative feedbacks shown in random order).  
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To increase monitoring (and relevance), we used emotional faces as evaluative feedback (see 
Walentowska et al., 2016 for details). To ensure that participants correctly attended to and carefully 
monitored each and every evaluative feedback, even when they were deemed irrelevant, ‘catch trials’ were 
added requiring to perform an additional two-alternative forced choice task based on the valence of the 
feedback. On average, in 15% of the trials and in random order, at the offset of the feedback, a question 
probed participants’ ability to categorize the face used as feedback as carrying either a positive or negative 
emotional expression. For this purpose, participants were instructed to press predefined keys on the 
response box with the index finger of their right hand. Accuracy, but not speed, was emphasized in this 
task, and no time limit was imposed.  
The experiment consisted of a short training session (32 trials), followed by 6 experimental 
blocks, each including 56 trials (40 Go and 16 NoGo trials in each block). Go/NoGo trial presentation was 
randomized within blocks. There were 3 blocks assigned to one of two relevance conditions (relevant vs. 
irrelevant). Two specific orders were created: R-I-R-I-R-I or I-R-I-R-I-R, with ‘R’ referring to relevant 
and ‘I’ to irrelevant condition. In total, four different versions of the experimental procedure were created, 
and participants were randomly assigned to one of them, with the mapping between the color of the frame 
(blue vs. magenta) and relevance (relevant vs. irrelevant) being counterbalanced across participants. 
After each block, participants were asked to evaluate how relevant the feedback was during the 
previous block by means of a Visual Analog Scale (VAS), ranging from -50 (not at all) to +50 (very 
much). These subjective ratings served as an indirect manipulation check.  
Stimulus presentation and response recording were controlled using E-prime software (V2.0., 
http://www.pstnet.com/products/e-prime/), and all visual stimuli were presented to participants using a 21-
inch CRT screen.  
2.3. EEG acquisition, ERP data processing, and statistical analyses  
Continuous EEG was acquired at 512 Hz using a 64-channel (pin-type) Biosemi Active Two system 
(http://www.biosemi.com), referenced online to the Common ModeSense (CMS)-Driven Right Leg 
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(DRL) ground, with the electrodes placed according to the extended International 10-20 EEG system. 
Horizontal and vertical EOG were monitored by means of 4 electrodes, placed above and below the right 
eye and on the outer canthi of both eyes. Two additional electrodes were placed at both mastoids. 
The SPN was computed offline following a standard procedure of data transformations (Keil et 
al., 2014): (i) 50-Hz notch filter; (ii) EEG offline referencing using linked mastoids; (iii) -1000/+1000 ms 
segmentation around the onset of the feedback stimulus; (iv) pre-feedback interval baseline correction 
(from -1000 ms to -900 ms)
2
; (v) vertical ocular correction for blinks (Gratton et al., 1983); (vi) semi-
automatic artifact rejection (trials with motor artifacts were rejected, with a fixed criterion of ±80 μV); 
(vii) averaging for each response type separately (i.e., fast vs. slow hits); and (viii) low pass digital 
filtering of the individual average data (30 Hz). Subsequently, the SPN was defined as the mean voltage 
within 200 ms prior to the feedback onset (see Catena et al., 2012; Chwilla and Brunia, 1991; Masaki et 
al., 2010) over left and right frontal (F3, F4), central (C3, C4), and parietal (P3, P4) electrodes, creating in 
total a set of 6 non-overlapping locations.  
The resulting SPN amplitudes were submitted to mixed model ANOVAs with the between-
subjects factor UNCERTAINTY (low/low reward probability vs. high/intermediate reward probability vs. 
low/high reward probability), and the within-subject factors RELEVANCE (relevant vs. irrelevant), 
RESPONSE (fast vs. slow hits), SIDE (left vs. right), and LOCATION (frontal vs. central vs. parietal). 
Significant main or interaction effects were followed up by post-hoc paired t-tests.  
3. Results 
3.1. Behavioral results 
When reward probability was low, and hence uncertainty was low, participants had a larger number of 
slow hits (approximately 2/3) than fast hits (1/3; see Figure 2 A), as confirmed by the main effect of 
RESPONSE, F(1,29) = 64.85, p < 0.0001, ηp
2 
= 0.691, irrespective of RELEVANCE, F(1,29) = 2.32, p = 
                                                          
2 We also ran a separate analysis and used the pre-response interval as baseline correction (instead of the post-
response interval), and found that the SPN results remained unchanged.  
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0.138, ηp
2 
= 0.074. When reward probability was intermediate, and hence uncertainty was high, a similar 
number of fast and slow responses was evidenced (Figure 2 A), as revealed by the non-significant main 
effect of RESPONSE, F(1,29) = 2.01, p = 0.101, ηp
2 
= 0.091, irrespective of RELEVANCE, F(1,29) = 0.25, p 
= 0.621, ηp
2 
= 0.009. When reward probability was high, and thus the level of uncertainty was low, 
participants had a significantly larger number of fast hits (approximately 2/3) than slow hits (1/3; see 
Figure 2 A), as confirmed by the main effect of RESPONSE, F(1,29) = 58.61, p < 0.0001, ηp
2 
= 0.581, 
irrespective of RELEVANCE, F(1,29) = 1.12, p = 0.147, ηp
2 
= 0.064. In none of the conditions did the 
RESPONSE x RELEVANCE interaction reach significance (all ps > 0.234). A detailed presentation of 
complementing behavioral results for the low and intermediate reward probability conditions (such as RT 
speed for each condition, and performance scores for NoGo trials) can be found in Walentowska et al. 
(2016).  
 Accuracy for catch trials was high and did not differ as a function of reward probability, and/or 
relevance. For the low reward probability condition, 93.51% (SEM = 1.23) and 92.61% (SEM = 1.13) of 
catch trials were correctly recognized in the relevant and irrelevant blocks, respectively, t(29) = 0.51, p = 
0.236. In the intermediate reward probability condition, participants correctly categorized 92.69% (SEM = 
0.97) and 92.65% (SEM = 0.96) of catch trials in the relevant and irrelevant blocks, respectively, t(29) = 
0.12, p = 0.786. When reward probability was high, 89.78% (SEM = 1.11) and 91.44% (SEM = 1.23) of 
catch trials were accurately recognized in the relevant and irrelevant blocks, respectively, t(29) = 1.11, p = 
0.226.  
3.2. Manipulation checks    
Post-experiment subjective ratings showed that feedback provided in relevant blocks was perceived as 
more informative than in irrelevant blocks (see Figure 2 B), as confirmed by the significant main effect of 
RELEVANCE, F(1,87) = 192.67, p < 0.0001, ηp
2 
= 0.689. Interestingly, this effect was reliably modulated 
by UNCERTAINTY, as revealed by the highly significant RELEVANCE x UNCERTAINTY interaction, 
F(2,87) = 8.02, p = 0.001, η
2
 = 0.156. When uncertainty was high, relevant feedback was evaluated as more 
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informative than when uncertainty was low (in the low reward probability condition), t(58) = -3.82, p < 
0.001, while such a difference was not observed for irrelevant feedback, t(58) = 1.51, p = 0.136. Similarly, 
participants perceived relevant feedback as more informative in the high uncertainty condition than in the 
low uncertainty condition (when reward probability was high), t(58) = 3.51, p = 0.001, with no such a 
difference for irrelevant feedback, t(58) = 0.23, p = 0.816. Importantly, relevant and irrelevant feedback 
were evaluated comparably in both low uncertainty conditions (with low and high reward probabilities), as 
confirmed by independent samples t-tests: for relevant feedback, t(58) = -1.12, p = 0.268, and for irrelevant 
feedback, t(58) = 1.87, p = 0.097. 
 [insert Figure 2 about here] 
3.3. SPN results 
The ANOVA showed significant main effects of UNCERTAINTY, F(2,87) = 19.81, p < 0.0001, ηp
2 
= 0.313, 
RELEVANCE, F(1,87) = 13.47, p < 0.0001, ηp
2 
= 0.134, and LOCATION, F(2,174) = 93.09, p < 0.0001, ηp
2 
= 
0.517. Importantly, UNCERTAINTY interacted significantly with RELEVANCE, F(2,87) = 7.39, p = 
0.001, ηp
2 
= 0.145, and SIDE, F(2,87) = 4.35, p = 0.016, ηp
2 
= 0.091. The interaction between SIDE and 
LOCATION, F(2,174) = 8.47, p < 0.0001, ηp
2 
= 0.089, was also highly significant. All other main or 
interaction effects were non-significant (all ps > 0.095).  
 Next, we examined the effect of RELEVANCE at the SPN level separately for each 
UNCERTAINTY condition. When UNCERTAINTY was low (and reward probability was low; see 
Figure 3), no systematic change of SPN amplitude across conditions was observed. The ANOVA revealed 
only a significant main effect of LOCATION, F(2,58) = 27.53, p < 0.0001, ηp
2 
= 0.487, suggesting that the 
SPN amplitude was not modulated by RELEVANCE in this condition, t(29) = -1.21, p = 0.234. This main 
effect of LOCATION indicated a relatively more negative SPN component over central (M = -0.38 μV, 
SD = 3.47) and parietal (M = -0.63 μV, SD = 2.51) than over frontal (M = 3.41 μV, SD = 3.89) sites, as 
confirmed by follow up t-tests (frontal vs. central, t(29) = 6.31, p < 0.0001; frontal vs. parietal, t(29) = 6.04, p 
< 0.0001). The SPN amplitude did not differ between central and parietal sites, t(29) = 0.45, p = 0.655.  
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By contrast, when UNCERTAINTY was high (reward probability level was intermediate; see 
Figure 4), the SPN amplitude reliably differed as a function of RELEVANCE, with larger amplitudes for 
relevant than irrelevant feedback. The ANOVA showed significant main effects of RELEVANCE, F(1,29) = 
26.15, p < 0.0001, ηp
2 
= 0.474, SIDE, F(1,29) = 6.83, p = 0.014, ηp
2 
= 0.191, and LOCATION, F(2,58) = 
45.91, p < 0.0001, ηp
2 
= 0.613. Further, the interactions RELEVANCE x SIDE, F(1,29) = 5.52, p = 0.026, 
ηp
2 
= 0.161, RELEVANCE x LOCATION, F(2,58) = 3.61, p = 0.033, ηp
2 
= 0.111, and SIDE x LOCATION, 
F(2,58) = 10.56, p < 0.0001, ηp
2 
= 0.267 were all significant. Interestingly, the RELEVANCE x RESPONSE 
interaction was marginally significant in this condition, F(1,29) = 3.72, p = 0.064, ηp
2 
= 0.114. 
 The significant RELEVANCE x SIDE interaction showed that SPN amplitude was more negative 
over the right (M = -7.23 μV, SD = 4.41, and -4.41 μV, SD = 3.92 for the relevant and irrelevant feedback, 
respectively) than the left hemisphere (M = -5.98 μV, SD = 5.03, and M = -3.69 μV, SD = 3.91 for the 
relevant and irrelevant feedback, respectively), especially for relevant feedback. This was confirmed by 
post-hoc t-tests, t(29) = 3.07, p = 0.005 for relevant feedback, and t(29) = 1.88, p = 0.091 for irrelevant 
feedback. 
 The RELEVANCE x LOCATION interaction indicated that the SPN amplitude difference 
between relevant and irrelevant feedback was more pronounced over frontal, t(59) = -5.03, p < 0.0001, than 
central, t(59) = -4.58, p < 0.0001, or parietal sites, t(59) = -4.74, p < 0.0001.  
 Lastly, we further explored the trend-significant RELEVANCE x RESPONSE interaction. This 
interaction effect indicated a numerically larger SPN amplitude following fast hits (M = -7.13 μV, SD = 
5.17) than slow hits (M = -6.07 μV, SD = 4.69) while anticipating relevant feedback, t(29) = -1.06, p = 
0.116, without such a clear asymmetry while anticipating irrelevant feedback (M = -3.71 μV, SD = 4.11 
for fast hits, and M = -4.09 μV, SD = 4.11 for slow hits; t(29) = 1.14, p = 0.261). Further, when focusing on 
the F4 electrode position only (given our specific prediction about the locus of SPN amplitude 
modulations as a function of relevance and outcome) for which the SPN amplitude was most sensitive to 
RELEVANCE (see analyses here above), fast hits (associated with positive feedback) yielded a more 
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negative value than slow hits (associated with negative feedback) for relevant, t(29) = -2.41, p = 0.022 but 
not for irrelevant feedback, t(29) = 0.14, p = 0.886 (see Figure 4).  
Last, when UNCERTAINTY was low (but reward probability was high; see Figure 5), no 
systematic modulation of SPN amplitude across conditions was noticed. The ANOVA revealed only 
significant main effects of SIDE, F(1,29) = 4.92, p = 0.034, ηp
2 
= 0.145, and LOCATION, F(2,58) = 24.62, p < 
0.0001, ηp
2 
= 0.459. The main effect of SIDE reflected a larger SPN component over right (M = -5.76 μV, 
SD = 1.33) than over left hemisphere (M = -4.16 μV, SD = 1.27). The main effect of LOCATION 
indicated a more negative SPN component over central (M = -6.22 μV, SD = 3.21) and parietal sites (M = 
-7.55 μV, SD = 2.17) than over frontal (M = -1.87 μV, SD = 2.12) ones, as confirmed by follow up t-tests 
(frontal vs. central, t(29) = 9.21, p < 0.0001; frontal vs. parietal, t(29) = 11.74, p < 0.0001). The SPN 
amplitude did not differ between central and parietal sites, t(29) = 1.25, p = 0.134.  
[insert Figures 3-5 about here] 
4. Discussion 
Performance monitoring is an utmost important cognitive process that enables self-regulation (Inzlicht et 
al., 2014). It is based on the swift comparison between goals or intentions and action outcomes, and 
operates based either on response- (i.e., motor) or feedback-related reward prediction error signals 
(Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Ullsperger et al., 2014). Yet performance monitoring presumably not only 
depends on these reactive events, but it can also exploit additional neural signals that are proactive, 
sustained and anticipatory, and occur during the interval spanning from response execution until feedback 
delivery. The SPN component is usually elicited during this interval and meets these criteria, especially 
when participants await the presentation of an informative feedback stimulus (Brunia, 1988; Brunia and 
van Boxtel, 2001; Brunia et al., 2011), or when an unpredictable outcome is anticipated (Catena et al., 
2012; Fuentemilla et al., 2013; Morís et al., 2013). If the feedback is informative, then the SPN elicited 
prior to it usually grows in size at (right) frontal leads, such as F4 or FC4 electrode positions. 
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Based on previous research on SPN, however, it remained unclear which factor connected to 
informativeness precisely accounted for systematic amplitude modulations of the SPN component during 
performance monitoring, given that the notion of informativeness was often ill-defined. Building on this, 
we examined the specific (and possibly joint) contribution of goal relevance and uncertainty to the SPN 
component in a systematic way. On the one hand, goal relevance has been related to informativeness in a 
recent study from our group (Walentowska et al., 2016), and the results showed that performance 
feedback deemed relevant for the participant increases performance monitoring (at the FRN level). On the 
other hand, classical information theories in psychology (see Shannon, 1948) advocated a long time ago 
that uncertainty is positively (cor)related with informativeness, and thereby influences a wide range of 
cognitive processes, including decision making. In this framework, entropy provides a measure of an 
outcome’s uncertainty. More recently, brain imaging studies have shed light on how specific brain 
regions, such as the ACC and the insula, generate uncertainty estimates in a context-dependent and 
flexible manner, and in turn alter specific value signals during this process (see also Bach and Dolan, 
2012; Behrens et al., 2007; Bennett et al., 2016; Kid and Hayden, 2015).  
Our findings confirmed that these two factors can indeed be considered as two sources of 
information used by dedicated performance monitoring brain processes during feedback (and reward) 
anticipation. These findings might also explain why the factors studied in previous research (i.e., 
contingency, expectancy, and reward) led to systematic changes in the amplitude of the SPN during 
performance monitoring. In addition, our new results clearly confirm that these two factors reliably 
interacted with one another at the SPN level. Specifically, our results showed that the SPN was larger for 
relevant than irrelevant feedback, but only when uncertainty about outcome was high, as opposed to low 
(irrespective of the actual change of reward probability, being either low or high), as demonstrated by a 
highly significant interaction effect at the statistical level between these two variables. Importantly, 
because we compared an intermediate reward probability condition (where uncertainty about feedback 
outcome dominated) to two other ones where uncertainty was substantially reduced and comparable, but 
going in opposite directions (i.e., low and high reward probability), we could ascertain that SPN amplitude 
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modulations during reward anticipation were clearly related to uncertainty, as opposed to (defensive) 
motivation or valence for example. Below we discuss our findings and their implications for performance 
monitoring and reward processing in greater detail, while we also hint at some limitations of our study.  
Our manipulations of goal relevance and uncertainty turned out to be successful (Figure 2 B). 
Post-experiment ratings confirmed that participants judged relevant feedback to be overall more 
informative than irrelevant feedback. Crucially, this effect was significantly larger when the outcome was 
(highly) uncertain. Noteworthy, the (relevant) feedback was judged equally informative for low and high 
reward probabilities, these two conditions being evaluated significantly less informative than the 
intermediate reward probability condition characterized by uncertainty. This pattern of results in turn 
corroborates the assumption of synergistic effects of relevance and uncertainty during performance 
monitoring. In short, participants evaluated performance feedback in the elected speeded Go/NoGo task as 
the most informative when it was both relevant and uncertain, suggesting that these two variables actually 
combined to shape anticipatory feedback processing at the subject level (see also Figure 1 A and Figure 2 
B).  
SPN amplitude variations closely mimicked this interaction effect found at the behavioral level. 
Only if the outcome was highly uncertain (i.e., when a balanced number of positive and negative feedback 
experienced), then the SPN was eventually larger (more negative) for relevant than irrelevant feedback, 
especially at the right prefrontal lead (F4) where relevant fast hits (associated with reward/positive 
feedback) also led to a larger SPN than relevant slow hits (associated with punishment/negative feedback; 
see Figure 4). This result suggests that uncertainty is probably a pre-requisite to allow for modulation by 
goal relevance at the SPN level. However, the reverse statement is not true, suggesting that reward 
processing during the anticipation phase depends more strongly on uncertainty than relevance somehow, 
or alternatively that relevance is subordinate to uncertainty: If the outcome was relatively certain for the 
participant (i.e., one outcome – either negative or positive – was associated with a 66% probability), then 
the proactive process captured by the SPN allowing to discriminate relevant from irrelevant feedback (and 
positive from negative) was absent (see Figures 3 and 5), without any clear modulation by feedback 
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relevance (or valence). A previous study (see Walentowska et al., 2016), however, did reveal a clear FRN 
component in the condition of low uncertainty/low reward probability for relevant feedback only, 
suggesting the presence of a strong reactive component in this condition. Based on this pattern of findings, 
it is therefore tempting to conclude that uncertainty biases reward-based performance monitoring by 
increasing “proactive” monitoring in the interval between response onset and feedback delivery, as if the 
feedback in this condition is potentially more informative for the participant than when uncertainty is 
reduced. Thus, uncertainty might increase informativeness by boosting or triggering enhanced proactive 
processes during feedback anticipation (Bennett et al., 2016; Kid and Hayden, 2015). As our new ERP 
results suggest, this enhanced proactive monitoring created by uncertainty at the SPN level enabled to 
discriminate relevant from irrelevant feedback (before its delivery). It even enabled to discriminate 
positive relevant from negative relevant feedback, although this reward anticipation effect was only 
marginally significant (in the omnibus ANOVA), and limited to the right frontal electrode only (F4) in our 
study. Note that this latter result is compatible with earlier ERP studies (Brunia, 1988; Brunia et al., 2011; 
Masaki et al., 2010) that already reported larger SPN effects during performance monitoring or related 
tasks at the same right compared to left frontal sites. 
Although several ERP studies in the past already reported systematic changes of the SPN 
amplitude as a function of predictability/expectancy (Catena et al., 2012; Fuentemilla et al., 2013; Morís et 
al., 2013), which can be linked to uncertainty, to the best of our knowledge, our new ERP results are the 
first to show that besides uncertainty, goal relevance also accounts for them. More specifically, it is likely 
that amplitude variations found in these earlier studies at the SPN level as a function of expectancy were 
also partly related to feedback’s relevance to some degree, understood as the extent to which it allowed to 
gauge the actual goal conduciveness of behavior, here corresponding to simple Go/NoGo actions 
(Walentowska et al., 2016). As a matter of fact, as our new ERP results clearly show, uncertainty alone 
did not suffice to trigger a reliable SPN component during feedback anticipation; the participant also had 
to be informed that the upcoming feedback would be goal relevant within this context of uncertainty. In 
sum, the main contribution of our study consists in clarifying which specific dimensions of information 
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may account for SPN amplitude variations during feedback anticipation, and systematically testing the 
complex interplay between these dimensions at the empirical level, as opposed to referring to 
“informativeness” broadly defined. In this way, we provide a modern framework that could be valuable 
for future ERP studies investigating the role of the SPN during performance monitoring. Another main 
contribution of this work is the confirmation that the SPN is sensitive to uncertainty, as opposed to 
changes in valence or motivation (see Figure 1 B). We observed however as a side note that even though 
the SPN did not vary with relevance and valence in both the low and high reward probability conditions, 
its amplitude was generally larger in the high than low reward probability condition (compare Figure 5 
and 3). This observation indirectly suggests that feedback anticipation was probably overall reduced when 
reward probability was low, an effect that might tentatively be explained by a change in defensive 
motivation between these two opposite conditions (sharing a similar level of uncertainty). Accordingly, 
future studies should assess the specific contribution of motivation, besides relevance and uncertainty, to 
amplitude modulations of the SPN during reward anticipation.    
A few limitations warrant comment. Following standard practice (Sambrook and Goslin, 2015; 
Walsh and Anderson, 2012), we mainly manipulated reward probability (i.e., the amount of positive 
feedback given after fast and correct actions in the present case) to create three different conditions that 
differed regarding how uncertain the outcome eventually was for the participant throughout the 
experiment. Although our manipulation checks (see results for subjective ratings, Figure 2 B) confirmed 
that this was effective (i.e., uncertainty increased perceived relevance of the feedback), we had no more 
objective measure of feedback uncertainty. Moreover, reward probability was a between-subjects variable 
in our design. Hence, we cannot formally rule out the possibility that the observed changes at the 
behavioral/ratings and ERP (SPN) level related to uncertainty actually resulted from uncontrolled group 
differences. To reduce this risk in our study, all three groups were matched for sample size, age, 
education, and gender distribution. Future studies may address this limitation by devising experimental 
designs where uncertainty would be manipulated within-subject (and measured more objectively than via 
a detour to relevance or informativeness). In a similar vein, future studies might also benefit from 
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considering possible changes in state and trait motivation (and affect) with the aim to learn more about 
motivation-based processes mediating performance monitoring effects (see also Severo et al., 2017). 
Accordingly, we recommend measuring motivation using standard questionnaires in future studies 
assessing reward processing at the SPN level. On top of that, investigating the SPN effects as a function of 
goal relevance in the sense of goal impact (i.e., the third meaning of goal relevance; Severo et al., 2017; 
Walentowska et al., 2016) could provide some interesting insights. Finally, it might also be fruitful in 
future ERP studies focused on the SPN component to better model and analyze the local and trial-by-trial 
predictability of feedback outcome. For example, it may be the case that the amplitude of the SPN not 
only varies systematically depending on global (blockwise) changes in the perceived goal relevance or 
reward probability, but that the most recent trial history also dynamically shapes and influences the 
willingness to acquire and explore new information on the next and subsequent trials, with effects visible 
at the SPN level. Such approach would require to collect sufficient ERP data depending on the actual 
sequence of trials (and feedback) encountered, something that we could not have performed in the present 
study, unfortunately. 
To conclude, the present study helped clarify which factors related to informativeness shape 
reward processing during feedback anticipation. Our new ERP findings suggest that both goal relevance 
and uncertainty account for amplitude variations at the SPN level during performance monitoring, and 
produce synergistic effects such that the largest proactive component is observed when the outcome is 
uncertain, but also goal relevant for the subject. 
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Figure 1. (A) Trial structure. At response onset (speeded Go/NoGo decision), a colored frame appeared 
around the target, signaling the response-feedback relation (relevant context) or lack thereof (irrelevant 
context). The frame stayed on screen until feedback offset, creating the main event of interest (feedback 
anticipation phase), and giving rise to the SPN component. One thousand ms elapsed after response onset 
until feedback delivery. The SPN component was measured as a mean ERP activity (at several electrode 
positions) during the 200 ms interval prior to the feedback onset. If feedback was informative (and carried 
reward-related information), expectations about reward grew prior to feedback onset, and enlarged the 
SPN component. In our study, feedback was deemed informative when both criteria of informativeness 
(relevance and uncertainty, marked here with a black frame) were met (as depicted by the large size of the 
colorful square; see lower left panel). Feedback was presumably less informative when only one of them 
was fulfilled (corresponding to the medium-sized square). In case none of them was met, feedback was 
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considered as uninformative (the smallest square). (B) Theoretically, the SPN amplitude could vary 
depending either on feedback’s uncertainty (inverted u-shape function) or valence/motivation (linear 
effect). If the SPN amplitude reflects uncertainty, then it is expected to be the largest when the outcome is 
uncertain and the lowest when it is certain, irrespective of the dominating valence. In contrast, if the SPN 
amplitude is sensitive to valence and motivation, then it should encode changes in reward probability, with 
the smallest SPN for low reward probability, and the largest for high reward probability. 
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Figure 2. (A) Mean number of accurate and timely (fast hits) and accurate but slow (slow hits) responses 
achieved by participants in our study, confirming that the manipulation was successful. At low 
uncertainty, reward probability was either low or high, irrespective of relevance. In contrast, at high 
uncertainty, positive and negative feedback were equiprobable, again, irrespective of relevance. (B) 
Manipulation checks of feedback’s informativeness (based on the VAS scale). Relevant feedback was 
evaluated as more informative than irrelevant feedback. Interestingly, when uncertainty was high, this 
effect was statistically stronger than when uncertainty was low (irrespective of low or high reward 
probability). In other words, participants judged the feedback as the most informative when it was both 
uncertain and relevant, corroborating that these two variables combined to shape informativeness at the 
subject level. Note that the scores can vary from -50 (not informative at all) to +50 (very informative). 
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean (SEM). *** p < 0.001. 
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Figure 3. (A) Topographical maps (horizontal, frontal and lateral views) of SPN results (mean ERP 
activity computed during 200 ms prior to the feedback onset). Each map shows an ERP difference wave 
where irrelevant feedback is subtracted from relevant feedback. (B) Feedback-preceding grand average 
ERP waveforms recorded from F3, F4, C3, C4, P3, and P4 electrodes for the SPN interval. When 
uncertainty was low, the SPN component was modulated neither by the relevance nor the response type. 
Note that R stands for response onset, and F for feedback onset. The time window of interest (-200/0 ms) 
is highlighted, and negativity is plotted upwards.  
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Figure 4. (A) Topographical maps (horizontal, frontal and lateral views) of SPN results (mean ERP 
activity computed during 200 ms prior to the feedback onset). Each map shows an ERP difference wave 
where irrelevant feedback is subtracted from relevant feedback (left column), while the right column 
shows the SPN valence effect (where negative feedback is subtracted from positive feedback). (B) 
Feedback-preceding grand average ERP waveforms, recorded from F3, F4, C3, C4, P3, and P4 electrode 
positions. Exclusively in this condition, the SPN component was larger for relevant than irrelevant 
feedback. Moreover, at the F4 position, it was also larger for positive than negative relevant feedback, 
suggesting reward anticipation when the feedback was both uncertain and relevant. Note that R stands for 
response onset, and F for feedback onset. The time window of interest (-200/0 ms) is highlighted, and 
negativity is plotted upwards.  
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Figure 5. (A) Topographical maps (horizontal, frontal and lateral views) of the SPN results (mean ERP 
activity computed during 200 ms prior to the feedback onset). Each map shows an ERP difference wave 
where irrelevant feedback is subtracted from relevant feedback. (B) Feedback-preceding grand average 
ERP waveforms recorded from F3, F4, C3, C4, P3, and P4 electrodes for the SPN interval. The SPN 
component was not modulated by the relevance nor the response type when uncertainty about the action 
outcome was low. Note that R stands for response onset, and F for feedback onset. The time window of 
interest (-200/0 ms) is highlighted, and negativity is plotted upwards. 
